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THE CENTRE FOR TAX SYSTEM INTEGRITY 
WORKING PAPERS 
 
 
The Centre for Tax System Integrity (CTSI) is a specialised research unit set up as a 
partnership between the Australian National University (ANU) and the Australian Taxation 
Office (Tax Office) to extend our understanding of how and why cooperation and 
contestation occur within the tax system.  
 
This series of working papers is designed to bring the research of the Centre for Tax 
System Integrity to as wide an audience as possible and to promote discussion among 
researchers, academics and practitioners both nationally and internationally on taxation 
compliance. 
 
The working papers are selected with three criteria in mind: (1) to share knowledge, 
experience and preliminary findings from research projects; (2) to provide an outlet for 
policy focused research and discussion papers; and (3) to give ready access to previews of 
papers destined for publication in academic journals, edited collections, or research 
monographs. 
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Abstract 
 
It is argued that many social factors (ethics, norms, legitimacy) affecting tax compliance 
derive their meaning and potency from taxpayers’ identities, the way they position 
themselves socially relative to other taxpayers, and the tax authority. Study 1 explored how 
1200 Australians categorised themselves spontaneously in the tax context. Study 2 used 
survey data from 965 Australians to investigate what implications different identities 
(personal, subgroup, national) have for tax ethical attitudes. An inclusive identity in terms 
of one’s nation was related to attitudes most conducive to tax compliance. It is concluded 
that the concept of identity is key to responsive regulation. 
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The multiplicity of taxpayer identities and their implications for tax ethics. 
 
Michael Wenzel 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Tax evasion and avoidance are a burden for modern societies, a strain on government 
revenue, and a threat to social justice (see Andreoni, Erard & Feinstein, 1998; Braithwaite, 
2003a; Roth, Scholz & Witte, 1989). For tax administrations, the challenge is to maintain 
or increase compliance of a vast number of taxpayers, with a great diversity in their 
objective tax situations as well as in the many social and psychological factors that 
impinge on their taxpaying behaviour. Taxpayers are not a homogenous collective but vary 
greatly in terms of their backgrounds, demographics, and group memberships. In fact, 
taxpayers are members of many different groups and social categories, whose impact on 
tax morale and behaviour is likely to depend on the way taxpayers position themselves in 
different groups, categorise themselves, and define their identity in a given situation 
(Taylor, 2003). Taxpayers’ identities affect their commitments and solidarities, their 
endorsement of certain values and goals, their internalisation of social norms, and their 
emotions and motivations.  
 
Therefore, an understanding of taxpayer identities could be essential for effective tax 
administration, specifically in terms of responsive regulation (Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992; 
Braithwaite, 2002; Braithwaite & Braithwaite, 2000). The notion of responsive regulation 
can be characterised by three elements: tactical, meta-strategic, and democratic 
responsiveness. First, the model of responsive regulation proposes that regulators use a 
plurality of regulatory techniques and styles from which they tactically select the one that 
responds best to the regulatees’ motivations and circumstances (Sparrow, 2000). Second, 
responsive regulation entails the meta-strategy of always encouraging voluntary 
compliance and self-regulation, through persuasion and/or ‘big guns’ that loom in the 
background (Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992). Third, responsive regulation embraces 
democratic principles of seriously engaging with regulatees, listening to their views and 
concerns, and working towards a shared understanding of principles and values in the 
regulatory domain (Braithwaite, 2003c). 
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I contend that regulatees’ identities, in relation to other regulatees and to the regulator, are 
key to responsive regulation in each of its three meanings, because: 
 
(1) they affect people’s motivations and attitudes and, thus, the appropriateness of 
regulatory tactics;  
(2) they affect people’s willingness to comply voluntarily and, thus, the strategies to 
yield their cooperation; and  
(3) they affect people’s commitment to goals and values and, thus, the effectiveness 
of processes to reach consensus.  
 
Regulators therefore need to understand how these identities come into effect, impact on 
regulatees’ behaviour, and can be managed toward greater levels of compliance. The 
present paper contributes to an understanding of identity processes in taxpaying behaviour 
by empirically exploring the variety of identities people adopt in the tax context and 
investigating what impact certain identities have on tax attitudes and ethics. 
 
Social factors in tax compliance 
 
Traditionally the decision to comply or not comply with tax laws has been understood as 
an individual’s rational pursuit of material outcome maximisation, weighing expected costs 
of detection and fines against the expected benefit of not paying the tax (Allingham & 
Sandmo, 1972). Accordingly, deterrence has been considered the regulatory strategy of 
choice, as it attempts, through detection and punishment, to reduce the expected outcomes 
from tax evasion and to make tax compliance a relatively more attractive option (Fischer, 
Wartick & Mark, 1992).  
 
However, in particular more recent research has argued and shown that such a perspective 
is too limited and that more social factors also influence taxpaying behaviour. Specifically, 
taxpayer ethics in the sense of a felt moral obligation to pay taxes honestly have been 
shown to affect tax compliance (for example, Bosco & Mittone, 1997; Reckers, Sanders & 
Roark, 1994; Schwartz & Orleans, 1967). Likewise, it has been argued social norms, that 
is, the perceived practice or endorsement of evasion among reference others, impact on tax 
compliance (for example, De Juan, Lasheras & Mayo, 1994; Spicer & Lundstedt, 1976; 
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Wallschutzky, 1984; Webley, Cole & Eidjar, 2001; Wenzel, 2004a). Personal ethics and 
social norms have been understood as implying other forms of costs, such as guilt and self-
concept dissonance, or shame and reputation loss, which can deter taxpayers from evading 
tax (Gordon, 1989; Grasmick & Bursik, 1990). However, ethics and norms may not only 
add other deterrents to the equation but also moderate the effectiveness of formal 
sanctions. First, strong personal ethics can make deterrence superfluous, because taxpayers 
driven by strong tax ethics are motivated to comply irrespective of personal costs or 
benefits (Wenzel, 2004c; see also Paternoster & Simpson, 1996). Second, perceived social 
norms against tax evasion can increase the effects of formal sanctions, because they imply 
additional, socially mediated costs (loss of opportunities, severance of relationships, and so 
on) when tax evasion is detected and/or punished (Wenzel, 2004c). Third, formal sanctions 
can be counterproductive because they undermine ethics and/or reduce trust in other 
people’s cooperative behaviour (Frey, 2002; see also Mulder et al., 2003). 
 
Another category of social factors that has been shown to affect taxpaying attitudes and 
behaviour are perceptions of fairness. Taxation involves numerous considerations of 
justice and fairness, including the perceived fairness of outcomes (for example, tax burdens 
and tax-funded benefits), fairness of procedures and treatment (for example, rights and 
respectful treatment), and fairness of sanctions (for example, punishment and amnesties; 
Wenzel, 2003). It has been argued that perceptions of fairness can affect tax attitudes and 
behaviour because, through tax evasion, taxpayers may want to compensate or adjust for 
the unfairness of their tax burdens and benefits. Perceptions of unfairness may also reduce 
satisfaction with, or the perceived legitimacy of, the tax system; and this leads to 
resentment, resistance, and a reduced sense of moral obligation to comply with tax laws 
(for example, Cowell, 1992; Falkinger, 1995; Kinsey, Grasmick & Smith, 1991; Kirchler, 
1997; Magner et al., 2000; Murphy, 2003; Wenzel, 2002; see also Tyler, 1990, 2001a).  
 
Indeed, among moral factors, personal ethics and legitimacy may be considered the most 
proximal predictors of tax compliance, with personal ethics attributable to the person (that 
is, oneself) and legitimacy being attributed to the system or authority. Personal ethics 
depend on one’s socialisation, the perceived social norms of one’s reference groups, and 
one’s trust in other people (which may then also extend to the tax authority and thus to 
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legitimacy; Job & Reinhart, 2003). Perceptions of legitimacy depend on the perceived 
justice of the tax system, trust in the tax authority based on the perceived fairness of its 
procedures and conduct (see Tyler & Huo, 2002), and the institution’s perceived 
representativeness of oneself or one’s relevant social group, its goals and values (see 
Turner& Haslam, 2001). Essentially, both personal ethics and perceptions of legitimacy are 
therefore socially determined by the way taxpayers position themselves towards other 
people and the tax authority, and thus: 
 
(1) whether they let themselves be influenced and socialised, or by whom,  
(2) whose outcomes and treatment they are concerned about (in terms of fairness or 
favourability), and  
(3) what goals and values they are committed to and use to judge the 
representativeness of the tax authority.  
 
Such positioning relative to others and the institution, it is argued here, is reflected in one’s 
self-categorisation and identity in the given social context, as I will explain now. 
 
Identity and self-categorisation  
 
People structure their environment and derive meaning from their social world through a 
process of categorisation (see McGarty, 1999). Through categorisation, they attribute 
relative similarity to objects or people grouped together as elements of one category in 
contrast to other categories, which in turn they consider as relatively different from the 
former category. Categorisation thus involves the attribution and accentuation of 
intracategory similarities and intercategory differences (Tajfel & Wilkes, 1963). If 
perceivers are themselves involved and considered as members of a category, the process 
is one of self-categorisation (Turner, 1987). Self-categorisation can be regarded as the 
cognitive foundation of social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), which has comprehensive 
effects on people’s social behaviour (see Ellemers, Spears & Doosje, 1999; Haslam, 2004; 
Simon, 2004). Importantly, self-categorisation leads to self-stereotyping: the ascription of 
traits, norms, and goals of one’s social group to oneself (Turner, 1987). People who 
categorise themselves as members of a certain social group are likely to adopt their group’s 
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positions as their own position and internalise its norms; and they are likely to regard their 
group’s objectives as their own objectives and are committed to these group goals.  
 
Which self-categorisation is psychologically relevant, or salient, in a given context is an 
interactive function of situation and perceiver factors (Oakes, 1987). First, a categorisation 
is more likely to be salient if it fits a pattern of similarities and differences in a given 
context, and if it does so consistent with expectations, theories, or ideologies about the 
categories involved. Second, perceivers may be differently prepared to use one rather than 
another category, for instance, depending on how well the categorisation serves their goals 
and needs. For example, if a tax authority decides to take action against the emergent wide-
spread use of tax shelters among what is seen as ordinary taxpayers, after it is perceived to 
have tolerated the use of similar tax shelters among wealthy taxpayers (see Hobson, 2002; 
Murphy, 2003), the categorisation between ordinary and wealthy taxpayers fits the 
apparently differential treatment by the tax authority. This categorisation may further be 
consistent with the perceivers’ preconceptions about government institutions favouring the 
wealthy and big business. Moreover, the ordinary/wealthy taxpayer categorisation may be 
beneficial to the perceivers’ goals in this context, as it supports their claim of inconsistent 
application of the law and thus illegitimacy of the tax authority’s actions. Another 
perceiver factor determining the salience of self-categories is the centrality for one’s self-
concept or the level of identification with the respective group (Oakes, 1987). To continue 
the example, taxpayers who identify strongly with their blue-collar heritage, or who take 
pride in their tendency to fight for causes of the disadvantaged, may be more inclined to 
adopt an ordinary/wealthy categorisation and brand the tax authority’s actions as 
discriminatory in this respect. 
 
Moreover, people can categorise themselves as members of variously inclusive categories 
(Turner, 1987). For example, as we have seen, people may regard themselves as members 
of a taxpayer subgroup such as ordinary versus wealthy taxpayers, or as employed rather 
than self-employed taxpayers, and so on. Alternatively, people may not draw such 
subcategorisations and regard themselves instead as taxpayers or citizens of their country, 
which is probably the most abstract and most inclusive category relevant in the tax arena. 
However, people could also categorise themselves at a less inclusive level, for instance as 
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members of a certain occupation (that is, a subcategory among the employed taxpayers). 
They may even perceive themselves as individuals, that is, as not sharing a relevant 
category with others. Importantly, whatever the salient level of self-categorisation, one’s 
self-stereotyping in terms of that category means self-ascription of similarities with fellow 
members and differences to other categories. This implies that those similarities are less 
likely to be seen as differences to fellow members, inhibiting self-categorisation at a lower 
level of inclusiveness, and those differences are less likely to be seen as similarities to 
members of other groups, therefore inhibiting self-categorisation at a more inclusive level 
(Turner, 1987). For example, when self-categorising as citizens, people may be committed 
to a perceived social norm of honestly contributing one’s lawful share of taxes to the 
welfare of one’s country. This would inhibit the self-categorisation as, say, low-income 
taxpayers, if their perceived norm was to use tax evasion to protest against disadvantages 
in the tax system. (Note, however, that subgroups can also justify such protest behaviour 
exactly through reference to values that they claim are shared within the more inclusive 
category, such as principles of fairness; Wenzel, 2004d).  
 
Multiplicity of taxpayer identities 
 
I have argued that taxpayers can perceive themselves in various ways and define their 
social place through self-categorisations at various levels of inclusiveness (for example, as 
individuals or in terms of occupation, income-level, or citizenship). These self-
categorisations and identities determine the norms people adhere to, the goals and values 
they feel committed to, and the interests they try to maximise. Consistent with this, recent 
research has provided evidence that self-categorisations and social identities can affect 
taxpaying attitudes and behaviour. For example, research by Sigala (1999; see also Sigala, 
Burgoyne & Webley, 1999) has shown that different occupational groups have different 
norms. Cash-in-hand payments and their underreporting are considered normal and more 
acceptable in some occupations, whereas such practice is considered inconsistent with 
norms and potentially jeopardises one’s professional reputation in others. However, 
whether or not people adhere to perceived social norms, and/or whether they internalise 
them as their own ethics and act upon them, should depend on their level of identification 
with the respective reference group (Wenzel, 2004a).  
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There is some evidence that taxpayers who identify strongly with their nation are less 
inclined to evade tax (Wenzel, 2002). That is, identified with the inclusive group that 
benefits collectively from the tax system and that is represented by the political and public 
institutions that administer the tax system, they seem more committed to make sacrifices 
for its welfare and accept the legitimacy of its institutions. Further, such inclusive self-
categorisation and commitment to collective goals appear incompatible with a self-
categorisation as individuals and the maximisation of purely individual outcomes, which 
would instead dictate not paying tax while enjoying tax-funded benefits. Correspondingly, 
findings showed that the perceived favourability (to the individual) of tax decisions was 
related to tax compliance only when respondents did not identify strongly with the 
inclusive category, their nation (Wenzel, 2002). 
 
It needs to be said, however, that inclusive identification does not unconditionally mean 
greater levels of tax compliance. This is so, first, because the inclusive category may be 
perceived to represent particular values and principles of fairness, which those who 
identify with this category are committed to and use to evaluate tax system and authority. 
The tax system needs to be seen as consistent with these values in order to be considered 
fair and legitimate, and thus worthy of being complied with (Wenzel & Jobling, 2004). 
Indeed, in a recent study, perceptions of unfairness were found to be related to self-
reported tax evasion only for respondents who identified strongly with their nation 
(Wenzel, 2002). Second, when taxpayers see their (inclusive) self-categorisation as hard-
working, decent, and good citizens being disputed by a tax authority treating them as tax 
cheats (implicitly accusing them of deliberately and selfishly exploiting the tax system), 
such inclusive identity can in fact turn into resistance against the tax authority and fuel tax 
protest (Hobson, 2002). Third, a commitment to fairness based on inclusive self-
categorisation can be moderated by simultaneous sublevel identities that determine whose 
fair treatment taxpayers are more narrowly concerned about (Wenzel, 2004b). That is, 
people’s fairness judgments or arguments are likely to be shaped by the perspective of the 
particular subgroup they identify with (see Wenzel, 2004d). Finally, when the inclusive 
category (for example, the nation in the context of taxation) is perceived to represent 
individualist values and norms, identification could paradoxically encourage individualist 
self-serving behaviour, and this process could at least attenuate the positive effects of 
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identification on group-serving, collectivist orientations (Jetten, Postmes & McAuliffe, 
2002; McAuliffe et al., 2003). 
 
Generally, however, it can be argued an inclusive identity tends to abstract from 
particularistic interests and goals, such as those of one’s taxpayer subgroup or of oneself 
personally. It should instead imply a commitment to shared goals and common institutions 
such as the tax system. A self-categorisation at a subgroup level, in contrast, should entail 
greater commitment to the outcomes and interests of that particular group. Given that this 
group is likely to be defined in opposition to other groups and perhaps even to the tax 
authority itself, this subgroup identity could tend to reduce commitment to projects and 
goals shared at an inclusive level and could involve outright resistance to the tax authority. 
In contrast, taxpayers self-categorising primarily as an individual, as being relatively 
different and independent from others (Kampmeier & Simon, 2001), should neither feel 
particularly bound by the goals and values of the inclusive category nor by any subgroup 
interests. They should instead focus on their individual outcomes.  
 
To sum up, there are strong arguments and emerging evidence that the way taxpayers see 
themselves and define their identity in the context of taxation affects their attitudes and 
views with regard to taxpaying. However, so far very little is known about the identities 
that taxpayers do adopt – unprompted and spontaneously – in the area of tax. This question 
will be addressed in the first study reported here, while a second study will investigate 
implications of selected social identities for tax attitudes and ethics. 
 
STUDY 1 
 
What kinds of identities do people adopt in the context of taxation? To answer this 
question, I am using here data from a mail survey of Australian citizens (Braithwaite, 
2000). At this point our interest is in unprompted self-categorisations of taxpayers in the 
taxation arena, and a qualitative measure with an open response format was therefore used. 
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Data 
 
The self-completion questionnaire was sent to a random sample of 7003 Australian citizens 
drawn from the Australian electoral roll (not counting out-of-scope cases such as mail 
returned to sender). After repeated appeals for participation, 2040 questionnaires, or 29%, 
were returned. The sample proved broadly representative for the Australian adult 
population, but – as most surveys – it somewhat over-represented older and more highly 
educated citizens (for details, see Mearns & Braithwaite, 2001). However, the present 
analysis focuses on an open-format question for which a relatively great proportion of 
cases had missing values; there were exactly 1200 valid entries (another 18 responses 
betrayed misunderstandings of the question and were ignored). Comparing cases of non-
response with valid cases, a binomial logistic regression yielded no effects of sex or 
personal or family income. However, responders were somewhat younger and more highly 
educated than non-responders.  
 
Measures 
 
Of main concern in the present context is the question of how respondents see, define, or 
identify themselves in the context of taxation. To avoid an abstract or academic tone of this 
question (and thus reduce the risk of non-response), a more concrete formulation and 
operational instruction was used: ‘Can you describe the sort of people who you think of as 
being in the same boat as you in terms of paying tax?’ Respondents were given one line to 
write down their answer, but responses varied in length and number.  
 
Two independent coders categorised the responses; there were overall 1200 valid cases. 
Most respondents indicated a single identity (n = 729), but in other cases there were two   
(n = 358) or three categorisable responses (n = 113). In rare cases where even more self-
categories were listed, the coders only categorised the first three responses and skipped the 
rest (assuming that the first entries were the most relevant ones); when entries were very 
similar or even redundant, the coders used their discretion and coded three entries that 
represented the range of alternatives. Generally, the two coders had to decide on the 
number of distinct responses and categorise the responses into a classification scheme. The 
scheme was developed inductively over the first 200 cases (beginning with a broad outline) 
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and comprised 66 response categories ordered in 16 broader classes. A test for inter-rater 
reliability was based on the coding of the next 400 cases. Overall, the two coders agreed 
initially in their classification of 78% of categorised responses, which indicated a 
satisfactory level of reliability. Responses on which there was no initial agreement were 
settled through consensus between coders.  
 
Because respondents could have multiple responses, each response category was treated as 
a separate variable. That is, for each of the 66 response categories, respondents were given 
a score of 0 (= no) or 1 (= yes), depending on whether they gave a response that was 
classified as an instance of that category; similarly for the 16 broader classes. It should be 
noted that, because the majority of respondents provided only one answer to the self-
categorisation question, the class (and category) variables tended to be mutually exclusive 
and negatively related. Therefore, statistical techniques (for example, factor analysis, 
multi-dimensional scaling) usually used to empirically derive more abstract dimensions 
from a set of variables were not appropriate here. 
 
Prior to the open-answer question about the relevant self-category, respondents were also 
asked to rate the perceived tax burden of their self-category: ‘Think about people who are 
in the same boat as you when it comes to paying tax. In your opinion, do they pay … 1 = 
much more than their fair share, 2 = a bit more, 3 = about their fair share, 4 = a bit less, or 
5 = much less than their fair share’. Of course, in cases where respondents proceeded by 
mentioning more than one self-category, it is unclear to which self-category’s tax burden 
their rating referred, or whether it was an aggregate rating of tax burdens of all self-
categories mentioned. This added some white noise to this measure, which should thus 
permit only conservative estimates of its relationships to other variables. 
 
Results 
 
Altogether, the 1200 respondents provided 1784 responses to the question of who they 
thought of as being in the same boat as themselves when it comes to tax. The responses 
were categorised into 66 basic categories, which reflect a wide range of self-
categorisations that respondents adopted in this context. Table 1 shows the frequencies for 
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these basic categories as well as the 16 more abstract classes. With regard to classes, it can 
be seen that self-categorisations most frequently referred to employment status (n = 474), 
economic situation (335), professional group (262), status as recipient (or non-recipient) of 
government benefits (139), moral attributes (109), and family status (90).  
 
The most frequent basic category was employed (295) from the employment class. On the 
one hand, this result reflects of course the simple fact that most taxpayers and most survey 
respondents earn their income as employees. On the other hand, the finding indicates that 
many do not see this as a simple fact but rather as worthwhile stating, as defining their 
identity and role within the tax system. The importance of this identity may derive from the 
view that their status as pay-as-you-earn taxpayers (whose taxes are withheld by their 
employers) defines their tax situation in comparison to the self-employed and employers. 
As employees, taxpayers lack very much the flexibility of controlling their income 
situation and of structuring their tax affairs which is considered typical of self-employed 
and business taxpayers. Our data do not allow detailed conclusions about the wider 
implications of this self-definition. However, out of 11 respondents who defined 
themselves explicitly as having little opportunity for tax minimisation, 9 categorised 
themselves also as employed taxpayers, a result that is clearly beyond chance (Fischer’s 
Exact Test: p < 0.001). It may thus be the case that employed taxpayers define themselves 
as such because they think this self-category fits the situation where they are deprived of 
tax minimisation opportunities that other taxpayer groups have. 
 
The second most frequent basic category for self-definitions was low income (159) 
immediately followed by middle income (144). Of course, at one level it is again a rather 
trivial fact that the economic situation determines one’s tax situation, for example simply 
due to different tax rates applying to different income brackets. However, the importance 
of one’s economic situation for self-definition may also reflect a class identity in the 
context of taxation that is due to feelings of relative deprivation and perceived social 
unfairness. Indeed, the discourse about tax is very much dominated by distinctions between 
the rich and the poor, big business and small business, where the rich are viewed as having 
the means and the quality of legal advice to get away with hardly paying any tax at all. In 
contrast, the poor cannot escape their tax burden. Instead, because they may also be 
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recipients of income support that they also find reduced when their income increases, in 
Australia their effective tax rates may even top the nominal tax rates for the wealthiest 
taxpayers. 
 
To investigate this further, the relationships between self-categories nominated in the open-
format question and the rating of the self-categories’ tax burden were analysed by point-
biserial correlations (Table 1, most right-hand column). Of course, due to the fact that 
numerous self-categories basically competed for nomination and only a fraction of 
respondents agreed on the same self-category, the variance was low and correlation 
coefficients could thus not be expected to be sizable. Nonetheless, in line with the previous 
discussion respondents who nominated low-income earners as their self-category, more 
than those who did not, indicated that their tax burden exceeded their fair share (r = -0.08, 
p = 0.012). Self-categorisation as middle-income earners was similarly related to the 
perceived amount and unfairness of the self-category’s tax burden (r = -0.09, p = 0.003). 
However, interestingly, the same result emerged for people self-categorising as high-
income earners: they also tended to regard their self-category’s tax burden as unfairly high 
(r = -0.09, p = 0.003). Thus, whatever their economic situation was, respondents who self-
categorised in terms of their economic standing tended to regard their self-category’s tax 
burden as high and unfair. For high-income earners this may be due to the higher formal 
tax rates that apply to them.  
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Table 1: Classification of open-format self-categorisations in the context of taxation: 
Frequencies and correlation with the self-category’s perceived tax burden  
 
Class n Category Examples n r 
Inclusive  72 abstract everybody, humans  3 -0.02 
  national Australian [residents/citizens/taxpayers] 3 0.01 
  average Mr. Average, average [Australian] 65 0.03 
  other  3 -0.04 
Economic  335 low income low income, battlers, working class 159 -0.08* 
  middle income average/middle income, middle class 144 -0.09**
  high income high income earners, well-off, wealthy 33 -0.09**
  other  1 0.02 
Educational 12 less educated untrained, unqualified, semi-skilled 2 -0.01 
  highly educated educated, skilled, qualified 9 0.02 
  other  1 0.09**
Employment 474 unemployed  12 0.06* 
  employed PAYE, wage earners, ordinary workers 295 -0.03 
  self-employed (sub)contractors, sole traders 55 -0.02 
  part-time casual workers, seasonal worker 49 0.04 
  cash recipients  1 0.09**
  retired retired, retirees 36 0.06* 
  student  42 0.02 
  house keeper house wife 17 0.03 
  other contract worker, full-time volunteer 2 -0.06 
Professional 262 trainee trainees, apprentices 1 -0.02 
  farmer farmers, primary producers 21 0.04 
  blue-collar blue-collar workers, labourers, tradies 38 -0.05 
  sales person sales persons, retailers 5 0.03 
  office worker public servants, clerical workers 20 -0.00 
  professional (semi)professional, white collar 46 0.07* 
  manager directors, executives 15 0.04 
  academic university lecturer, professor 1 -- 
  small business  small business [owner, proprietor]  66 0.04 
  entrepreneurs businessmen, entrepreneurs 8 -0.00 
  other specific occupations (e.g., bricklayers) 56 -0.00 
Moral 109 moral honest, law-abiding, community-minded 46 0.01 
  deserving hardworking, diligent, clever [people] 65 -0.06* 
  victim highest tax bracket but not rich 25 -0.08* 
Gender 4 male men, males 1 -0.02 
  female women, females 3 -0.01 
Age 24 young young, youth 16 0.01 
  middle-aged  5 -0.01 
  mature mature/older [people] 3 0.02 
Family status 90 single  20 -0.01 
  married/de facto couple 4 -0.04 
  family  parents, people with kids 46 0.00 
  sole parent sole parent, single with kid(s) 21 -0.03 
  divorcee  1 -0.02 
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Urban/Rural 4 urban urban, suburban 2 -0.02 
  rural rural 2 -0.03 
Family income 53 single inc. family  28 -0.07* 
  single inc. couple  4 -0.01 
  dual inc. family  18 -0.03 
  dual inc. couple  4 -0.03 
Gov. Benefits 139 allowance  welfare, unemployment benefits 7 -0.07* 
  pension age, disability 89 0.02 
  self-funded self-funded retirees, superannuants 46 0.03 
  no benefits  7 0.04 
Social Net 29 family and friends  18 0.03 
  work colleagues  22 0.04 
Investment  41 investors (small) investments, shareholders 16 0.06 
  property landlords, property owners 7 -0.00 
  own house  2 0.02 
  other income  3 0.01 
  debt debts, mortgages, HECS (student loan) 15 -0.01 
Dependents 16 no dependents  5 -0.04 
  with dependents  9 -0.04 
  dependent  2 0.02 
Tax avoidance 12 tax minimiser  1 0.02 
  low opportunity … for tax minimisation 11 0.03 
 
Discussion 
 
Overall, this first study shows that taxpayers perceive themselves in terms of a large range 
of social categories. The most frequent self-categories refer to taxpayers’ employment 
status, economic status, and their professional group. This may be so partly because these 
self-categories describe fittingly their factual legal tax situation. But these self-
categorisations in the tax context could also reflect concerns about unfairness and a sense 
of deprivation as members of that category. This is supported by the finding that self-
categorisation in terms of one’s income situation, whether it is low, medium or high, was 
related to the view that one’s self-category had an unfairly high tax burden.  
 
Relative to these ‘oppositional identities’ (Akerlof & Kranton, 2000) in terms of economic 
status and perhaps occupation, we would expect self-categorisations as honest taxpayers 
and Australian citizens/residents to have more beneficial implications for tax morale. 
Interestingly, these groups were less often spontaneously referred to as self-categories in 
 15
the tax context, in particular so the inclusive category of being Australian. The second 
study will investigate these identities further. 
 
Also, it needs to be critically noted that, while the operational formulation of the self-
categorisation measure was deliberately chosen to facilitate understanding of the question, 
in other respects it might have limited options of self-definition. This is so because it 
referred to self-categories that included other people and thus, by default, it did not seem to 
allow for self-definitions in terms of individuality (that is, one’s personal rather than social 
self). In the second study, a measure of individual identity was also included. 
 
STUDY 2 
 
The first study provided us with insights into the range of self-categories and identities 
which may play a role in the area of taxation, and also why certain self-categories may be 
salient and relevant. In a second study, I investigated more explicitly the implications of 
certain taxpayer identities for tax attitudes and ethics. The analysis focused initially on five 
possible identities, namely identity in terms of economic status, occupational/industry 
group, membership in the Australian community, honest taxpayer, and individual. 
 
Self-categorisation in terms of economic status proved particularly salient in Study 1. It 
seemed to be related to perceptions of unfairness and possibly perceived shared resentment 
against the tax system. Being of more oppositional nature, we would expect such an 
identity to be related to relatively low tax ethics, perceptions of low legitimacy of the tax 
system, and non-compliance out of protest and retaliation. Self-categorisation in terms of 
occupation or industry was likewise very salient in Study 1. While there were no empirical 
data on this in the first study, it can be argued that such an identity again refers to an 
interest group believed to share a common fate (perhaps a relative deprivation) and norms 
of furthering its goals. Hence, such identity should again be related to reduced tax ethics, 
less perceived legitimacy, and non-compliance motivated by protest. 
 
Spontaneous self-categorisation as honest taxpayer was moderately frequent in Study 1, 
while an inclusive categorisation as Australian was rare. Both identities should have 
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mainly positive implications for tax ethics and perceptions of legitimacy. In fact, an 
identity as honest taxpayer seems to amount to a self-definition via positive tax ethics. 
Alternatively, it may be an identity as a compliant taxpayer, whether this compliance is 
driven by positive tax ethics or other factors (such as perceived deterrence or lack of 
opportunity). In any case, an identity as honest taxpayer should be a close precursor to tax 
compliance, and in this respect it might be considered a dependent variable in its own right 
whose determination by other identities is of interest. National identity, in fact, can be 
expected to be related to an identity as honest taxpayer as well as to positive tax ethics and 
legitimacy. National identification should imply putting the interest of one’s country first, 
above the particular interests of one’s subgroup and above one’s personal interests. It 
should motivate cooperation with others included in this social category, including 
representative institutions such as the tax system. And it should involve pride in serving 
one’s country and the well-being of fellow citizens, thus in being an honest taxpayer. 
 
Further, Study 2 also explored the meaning and implications of a personal identity, a self-
definition in terms of one’s individuality. On the one hand, it could be argued such an 
identity implies a sense of independence, of not owing anything to anyone, and thus of 
following one’s personal interests freely (see Kampmeier & Simon, 2001). If such 
taxpayers were motivated to evade tax, they would be more likely to do so out of a sense of 
justified self-interest, rather than feelings of resentment or antagonism towards the tax 
system. On the other hand, however, personal identity could also involve a sense of 
personal integrity, of living up to one’s ethical standards, which should thus be related to 
an identity as honest taxpayer and to positive taxpaying ethics. 
 
Data 
 
The data were taken from a survey of Australian citizens (Wenzel, Ahmed & Murphy, 
2002). A self-completion questionnaire was sent to a sample of 3284 Australian citizens 
randomly selected from the Australian electoral roll (not counting out-of-scope-cases). 
After repeated appeals to participate, 965 respondents, or 29%, returned their 
questionnaire. In the following analyses, deviations from this total N are due to missing 
values. 
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Measures 
 
Five different identities (individual, occupational, economic, Australian, and honest 
taxpayer) were each measured by three standardised 7-point ratings. First, ‘Where do you 
position yourself within the tax system? When you think about tax, do you see yourself 
primarily…(1) as an individual, (2) in terms of your occupational group, (3) as a member 
of the Australian community, (4) in terms of your income group, (5) as an honest 
taxpayer?’ (each option with a scale from 1= not at all, to 7 = very much; the same 
response format applied to all following items unless otherwise noted). Second, ‘What is 
important to you? (1) Your individuality, (2) your occupational group, (3) the Australian 
community, (4) your income group, (5) being an honest taxpayer?’. Third, ‘What do you 
feel pride in? (1) Being who you are personally, (2) belonging to your occupational group, 
(3) being a member of the Australian community, (4) belonging to your income group,    
(5) being an honest taxpayer?’. For each identity the three-item scale proved sufficiently 
internally consistent: personal identity ( = 0.66), occupational identity ( = 0.82), 
economic identity ( = 0.76), Australian identity ( = 0.79) and honest taxpayer identity 
( = 0.83). For each construct, items were averaged to obtain scale scores. 
 
Personal tax ethics and perceived social tax norms were measured by three items each 
(Wenzel, 2004a). The same three items were used for each concept, except that the subject 
of the question was either ‘you’ (personal ethics) or ‘most people’ (social norms): ‘Do you 
[most people] think one should honestly declare all income on one’s tax return?’, ‘Do you 
[most people] think it is acceptable to overstate tax deductions on one’s tax return?’ 
(reverse-coded), and ‘Do you [most people] think working for cash-in-hand payments is a 
trivial offence?’ (reverse-coded). The alpha consistency for either scale was rather low: 
personal tax ethics ( = 0.51) and social norms ( = 0.57). However, these measures were 
maintained in this form to be consistent with previous research (Wenzel, 2004a, in press). 
 
Anticipated feelings of shame/guilt if one were found out having defrauded the tax system 
were measured by four items. For each of two scenarios, (1) not declaring a cash payment 
of $5000 and (2) falsely claiming $5000 as work-related expenses, respondents were 
asked, if they got caught, ‘Would you feel embarrassed?’ and ‘Would you feel guilty?’ The 
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four items showed high internal consistency ( = 0.93) and were averaged to obtain scale 
scores. 
 
Perceived legitimacy of the tax system was measured by nine items that tapped into the 
perceived fairness of the Tax Office (for example, ‘Our tax system is fair’), the Tax Office 
representing Australian norms and values (for example, The Tax Office is an institution 
that represents what the Australian people believe in’) as well as favourability toward and 
trust in the tax authority (for example, ‘The Tax Office can be trusted to administer the tax 
system so that it is right for the country as a whole’). Scale scores were obtained by 
averaging across items ( = 0.91). 
 
Finally, the survey included measures of two possible broad motivations to evade tax: 
‘People who evade tax probably do so for many different reasons. Even if you would never 
evade tax, we are asking you to imagine why you might do it if you did. In other words, if 
you were to ever evade tax, what would be a likely reason for doing so? If I ever evaded 
tax, I would do so because…’ Four items measured an antagonistic motivation to defy the 
tax authority out of resentment or game-playing (for example, ‘I would enjoy tricking the 
Tax Office’, ‘I would have had a bad experience with the Tax Office and would want to 
get even’;  = 0.85). Five items measured a motivation of justified self-interest where 
taxpayers look after their own interests and may justify this with arguments of fairness (for 
example, ‘I would look after my own interests first, as everybody else does’, ‘I would want 
to compensate myself for being unfairly disadvantaged by the tax system’;  = 0.69).  
 
Respondent sex (1 = male, 2 = female), age (in years), education level (1 = not much 
formal schooling, 8 = post-graduate degree), family income (0, 5, 10, … 75, 100, 250+ 
thousand dollars) and language spoken at home (non-English speaking background, 1 = no, 
2 = yes) were also obtained and included here as background characteristics. However, 
they will not be discussed in detail. 
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Results 
 
Table 2 shows overall means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations for the five identity 
measures. Respondents indicated strongest identification as honest taxpayer, then as an 
individual and Australian; levels of identification with one’s economic and occupation 
groups were somewhat lower. Importantly, the latter two identities were strongly 
correlated (r = 0.71). Because these two concepts could therefore mutually inhibit their 
regression effects on other variables, the two scales were joined to form a single measure 
of subgroup identity (factor analyses confirmed that the six items of economic and 
occupational identities loaded on one factor). All six items were averaged for a score of 
subgroup identity ( = 0.87); its descriptive statistics are also included in Table 2. 
 
Regression analyses were used to investigate the implications of the different taxpayer 
identities for tax attitudes and ethics. First, because the identity as honest taxpayer is likely 
not only to affect, but also to be affected by one’s tax ethics, it could be considered partly a 
derivative of other identities.  
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics and correlations of identity variables 
 
Identity variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Individual  5.90 1.07 –     
2. Economic 4.32 1.50 0.04 –    
3. Occupational 4.16 1.60 0.04 0.71*** –   
4. Subgroup 4.24 1.43 0.04 0.92*** 0.93*** –  
5. Inclusive 5.59 1.25 0.33*** 0.35*** 0.32*** 0.35*** – 
6. Honest taxpayer 6.16 1.01 0.41*** 0.19*** 0.14*** 0.17*** 0.47*** 
Note. The variable subgroup is an aggregation of economic and occupational items. 
† p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
 
Table 3 (left-hand column) shows how an identity as honest taxpayer was related to the 
other taxpayer identities. While subgroup identity shows no relationship, both individual 
and Australian identities were positively related to an honest taxpayer identity. This 
indicates that a self-definition as honest taxpayer derives, on the one hand, from one’s most 
inclusive self-definition, presumably because it implies concern for the welfare of country 
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and fellow citizens who are considered part of one’s extended self. On the other hand, an 
honest taxpayer identity is also related to an individual identity that seems to include 
personal integrity and noncorruptability as positive attributes.  
 
Because an identity as honest taxpayer can thus bundle and mediate effects of the other 
taxpayer identities, all following analyses will be conducted in two steps: Step 1 without 
honest taxpayer identity and Step 2 including it as a predictor variable. Table 3 shows the 
results for the prediction of personal ethics, perceived social norms, and anticipated shame 
or guilt. The regression model for personal ethics yielded in the first step, consistent with 
the previous analysis, positive effects of both individual identity and Australian identity. 
Again, positive taxpayer ethics seem to derive partly from one’s personal integrity as a 
defining positive attribute of individual identity, and partly from one’s inclusive self-
definition that implies concern for collective welfare. However, subgroup identity was 
significantly negatively related to personal ethics: the more strongly taxpayers identified 
with their (economic or occupational) subgroup, the less they endorsed positive tax ethics. 
Highly identified with their interest group, taxpayers may not believe that conforming tax 
ethics are in the interest of their group, and they may instead perceive group norms as 
opposing the tax system. When the honest taxpayer identity was included in the model, it 
mediated the effect of individual identity completely, but the effects of Australian identity 
only partially. Even when controlling for honest taxpayer identity, Australian identification 
had still a significant effect on tax ethics. The effect of subgroup identity remained 
unchanged. 
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Table 3: Regression analyses (1) 
 
 Honest taxpayer identity  Personal ethics   Social norms   Shame/guilt  
Predictor () Step 1 () Step 2 () Step 1 () Step 2 () Step 1 () Step 2 () 
Sex 0.07* 0.04 0.01 -0.04 -0.05 0.11** 0.08* 
Age 0.04 0.20*** 0.18*** 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.03 
Education -0.07* 0.05 0.08* -0.05 -0.04 -0.02 0.01 
Family income -0.00 0.06† 0.06† 0.02 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 
NESB -0.01 -0.10** -0.10*** 0.05 0.06 -0.03 -0.03 
Individual identity 0.29*** 0.11** 0.00 0.05 0.02 0.04 -0.07† 
Subgroup identity 0.01 -0.19*** -0.20*** 0.07† 0.07† -0.06† -0.06† 
Australian identity 0.35*** 0.21*** 0.08* 0.04 0.01 0.26*** 0.12** 
Honest taxpayer identity -- -- 0.37*** -- 0.09* -- 0.38*** 
R2 0.30 0.15 0.24 0.02 0.03 0.09 0.19 
F 44.00*** 17.53*** 28.66*** 2.50* 2.69** 9.25*** 20.25*** 
df 8; 807 8; 803 9; 802 8; 797 9; 796 8; 798 9; 797 
† p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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The regression model for perceived social norms showed a marked absence of substantial 
effects. Interestingly, subgroup identity tended to be positively related to social norms 
conforming with the tax system. A speculative interpretation of this finding is that, when 
identifying with an interest group, respondents may regard their group as being rather 
antagonistic to the tax system, compared to which they consider the wider public as more 
conforming. It may be added that, while this effect was only marginally significant, it 
became significant and stronger ( = 0.12, p = 0.002) when personal ethics were 
controlled, suggesting that the effect indeed applied to norms attributed externally, to 
others outside one’s personal or social self. The small but significant positive effect of 
honest taxpayer identity indicates that respondents either derived their self-defining tax 
ethics from wider social norms or projected their own ethics onto the wider public 
(Wenzel, in press).  
 
The regression model for anticipated shame or guilt showed, in the first step, only a 
substantial effect of Australian identity: the more strongly identified in an inclusive sense, 
the more shame or guilt respondents anticipated in case of being caught for evading tax. 
Interestingly, individual identity was not related to shame/guilt, different from the findings 
for personal ethics. This indicates that shame/guilt are truly social emotions that derive 
from one’s commitment to the norms of one’s moral community. These emotions are not 
engaged in respondents who define themselves as autonomous and independent from 
others, even though personal integrity may be a relevant attribute of one’s individual self. 
The second step of the analysis showed that an honest taxpayer identity only partially 
mediated the effect of Australian identity on anticipated shame/guilt, further testimony to 
the social foundation of these important self-regulatory emotions. Controlling for honest 
taxpayer identity, individual identity even tended to be negatively related to shame/guilt, 
indicating that this identity may be about distancing oneself from the conformity pressures 
of the wider community. 
 
Table 4 shows the results of equivalent regression models for legitimacy, antagonistic 
motivation, and justified self-interest. First of all, the model for legitimacy yielded again a 
significant and substantial effect of Australian identity: the more strongly respondents 
defined themselves in this inclusive sense, the more legitimate they perceived the tax 
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system to be. Identification with one’s nation implies commitment to the values that are 
(supposed to be) reflected in its public institutions, as well as perceived representativeness 
of these institutions for one’s extended self (Wenzel & Jobling, 2004). Perceptions of 
legitimacy thus derive from an inclusive self-definition. In contrast, individual identity was 
negatively related to perception of legitimacy. This, again, suggests that an individual 
identity resists capture by a social group, strives to maintain independence from inclusive 
social values, or holds divergent views about what these values should be. Interestingly, 
however, subgroup identity, for which similar arguments could be made, was not 
systematically related to legitimacy. Honest taxpayer identity had likewise no effect and its 
inclusion, therefore, did not affect the other results. 
 
Finally, let us investigate the relationships between taxpayer identity and two broad 
motivations to evade tax. An antagonistic motivation to evade tax out of defiance, 
resistance, or retaliation against the tax authority showed small negative effects of 
individual and Australian identities. However, Step 2 revealed that these were fully 
explained by identification as honest taxpayer, which substantially inhibited such an 
antagonistic motivation. Subgroup identity, in contrast, had a weak but significant positive 
effect, suggesting that identification with subgroups, commitment to their particular 
perspective and perhaps collectively shared resentment about their treatment, contributes to 
an antagonistic motivation to evade tax. Subgroup identity also positively contributed to 
justified self-interest as a motivation to evade tax. However, individual identity had here 
also a significant positive effect. Thus, taxpayers strongly identifying as individuals, as 
independent and autonomous agents, may disengage themselves enough not to hold any 
antagonistic motivation against the Tax Office, but they feel free and justified to pursue 
their own interests. 
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Table 4: Regression analyses (2) 
 
  Legitimacy   Antagonistic motivation   Justified self-interest  
Predictor Step 1 () Step 2 () Step 1 () Step 2 () Step 1 () Step 2 () 
Sex 0.03 0.02 -0.07† -0.05 -0.07* -0.07* 
Age .11** .10** 0.01 0.02 -0.08* -0.08* 
Education 0.02 0.03 -0.04 -0.06 -0.09* -0.09* 
Family income 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
NESB 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Individual identity -0.09* -.10** -0.08* -0.02 .14*** .15*** 
Subgroup identity 0.01 0.01 0.09* 0.09* .12** .12** 
Australian identity .23*** .21*** -0.07† 0.00 -0.07† -0.07 
Honest taxpayer identity  0.06  -.21***  -0.01 
R2 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.04 
F 6.24*** 5.78*** 2.51* 5.21*** 4.48*** 3.98*** 
df 8; 784 9; 783 8; 800 9; 799 8; 803 9; 802 
† p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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Discussion 
 
This second study investigated various taxpayer identities in terms of their implications for 
tax attitudes and ethics. The findings show that both a socially very exclusive identity as an 
individual as well as a very inclusive identity in terms of one’s nation (the relevant 
inclusive category in the context of a national tax regime) have positive implications for 
tax ethics. However, for an individual identity these seem to be more limited. A strong 
personal identity seems to engage a sense of personal integrity as a positive attribute, 
which implies an identity as honest taxpayer and the self-ascription of positive tax ethics. 
However, the independence and disengagement from the social environment, which are 
inherent in such an exclusive self-definition, means that these ethics have limited self-
regulatory impact. They do not seem to imply feelings of shame or guilt anticipated for the 
case that one were caught evading tax. There also appears to be an attempt to maintain 
independence and escape any capture that the attribution of legitimacy to the tax system 
could imply. Moreover, there is a sense that tax evasion could be justified after all on the 
basis of justified self-interest. 
 
In contrast, an inclusive identity in terms of the nation puts one’s tax ethics on a social 
basis, with much broader effect. Consistent with the assumption that such an identity 
implies a commitment to the greater collective good, concern for the welfare of other 
fellow citizens as well as a sense of cooperation and cohesion, strongly inclusively 
identified taxpayers tend to define themselves as honest taxpayers and have positive tax 
ethics. Moreover, inclusive identity implies commitment to and internalisation of collective 
norms and values, leading to the anticipation of shame and guilt if one were caught 
evading tax – a powerful social control (Grasmick & Bursik, 1990). Further, inclusive 
identity means being committed to political processes that put public institutions in place 
as well as regarding these institutions as representing collectively shared values (but note 
that institutions also need to confirm these expectations, specifically by maintaining justice 
and fairness; Tyler, 1997; Wenzel & Jobling, 2004). Hence, institutions such as the tax 
authority and the tax system are considered more legitimate, instilling a sense of duty to 
comply with them (Tyler, 2001b).  
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Finally, identification at an intermediate level of inclusion, with a subgroup or interest 
group of taxpayers, tends to have adverse consequences for (conforming) tax ethics. It 
undermines personal tax ethics, tends to reduce anticipated feelings of shame and guilt, and 
instead fuels motivation to evade tax out of antagonistic posturing, resentment, and 
revenge, as well as out of justified sentiments to look after one’s own interests (see 
Braithwaite, 2003b). These effects are likely due to the feeling that one’s resentment is 
shared with others, which forges a subgroup identity and gives rise to group norms of 
dissent and noncompliance (which mean that tax evasion is not shameful but perhaps 
rather heroic). Such perceived subgroup consensus and social support trigger opposition 
and defiance against the tax authority as an outgroup (Taylor, 2003), or at least they lead to 
the view that it is time to look after one’s ingroup interests first.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The present research revealed that taxpayers consider themselves members of a large 
variety of social categories and groups. This result reflects the great heterogeneity of 
taxpayers in terms of their backgrounds and circumstances; but more importantly, it is 
testimony that these differences matter to them in the context of tax. Most taxpayers 
referred to their employment situation, their income status, and their professional group to 
position themselves; they categorised themselves mainly at intermediate levels of 
inclusiveness. They thus seemed to perceive greater division among taxpayers than they 
saw unity and similarity in contributing as taxpayers to the welfare of their country. In fact, 
only three out of 1200 respondents in Study 1 categorised themselves more inclusively as 
Australian citizens or taxpayers. While perhaps the framing of the question prompted 
greater self-categorisation at a subgroup level (even though nothing in the wording itself 
prevented respondents from using an inclusive category, as it probably did for individual 
self-categorisation), taken at face value and in light of the findings of the second study this 
result suggests a problem, at least for tax compliance in the Australian context.  
 
The second study showed that subgroup identities (in terms of profession and income) 
were negatively related to tax ethics and self-regulatory emotions such as shame and guilt; 
and they were positively related to two motivations to evade tax. In contrast, an inclusive 
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identification in terms of one’s nation was positively related to a range of attitudes and 
ethics conducive to tax compliance, namely an identity as honest taxpayer, conforming tax 
ethics, shame and guilt if found evading tax, and perceived legitimacy of the tax system. 
These positive effects of an inclusive identity are consistent with other research findings in 
social and organisational psychology, for example, that an inclusive group identity 
increases cooperation in social dilemmas (Brewer & Kramer, 1986; Brewer & Schneider, 
1990), rule compliance and extra-role behaviour in organisations and other contexts (Tyler 
& Blader, 2000; Tyler, Degoey & Smith, 1996), work motivation (Haslam, Powell & 
Turner, 2000), trust (Kramer, 1999), and attribution of leadership (Haslam & Platow, 
2001). 
 
The direct implication for tax administration and regulation more generally seems to be 
that social identity, specifically a sense of inclusion, can provide considerable leverage for 
compliance. Similar to leaders in organisational or political contexts, regulatory authorities 
may want to think of themselves as ‘entrepreneurs of identity’ (Reicher & Hopkins, 1996; 
see Haslam, 2004). Effective regulation, this suggests, should induce, maintain, and 
harness social identities that promise to be beneficial to the attitudes and compliance of the 
regulated. At least, regulators should be aware that whatever regulatory actions they take 
these could have negative side effects on people’s sense of identity, undermining 
compliance levels.  
 
A cynical interpretation could understand this as a call for mass manipulation through 
feigning a nice and harmonious inclusive identity, and there may indeed be some danger of 
this sort. However, first, I do not believe that the threat of punishment (as the standard 
regulatory means), even if it allows would-be offenders an informed weighing of costs and 
benefits of compliance, is more respectful of liberal values such as autonomy and freedom 
(see Duff, 2001). Second, a sense of inclusion can hardly be enforced. If it is seen as a 
manipulative and insincere means of control, this, as with other forms of coercion, will 
likely be attributed to an outgroup (Taylor & McGarty, 2001) – undermining the very 
attempt of portraying the regulator as a legitimate representative of an inclusive category. 
As a consequence, one-off measures that aim at quick fixes are unlikely to lead to positive 
results; rather the regulator will need to engage in a long-term process of sincere 
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relationship building. Such a process may build on principles of justice and fairness, 
treating people with respect, consulting broadly with one’s clientele, and conveying that 
one’s rules and actions are consistent with values broadly shared within the inclusive 
category (Tyler, 2001b).  
 
Moreover, while it can be concluded from the present findings that regulators should 
appeal to a sense of inclusive identity and avoid appearing socially divisive, they also 
should not simply ignore existing subgroup identities. On the contrary, similar to the 
forging of an organisational identity or the negotiation of a consensual conflict settlement 
(Eggins, Haslam & Reynolds, 2002; Eggins, Reynolds & Haslam, 2003), it is better to 
acknowledge the identities that matter to people, give these groups their say, and work with 
them towards a consensual understanding of a more inclusive identity. This would seem 
more effective in particular in a broad regulatory area such as taxation with its vast 
numbers of regulatees. To consensualise an inclusive identity, the hierarchical structure of 
social categories could here exactly be utilised by engaging first with smaller interest 
groups, enabling them to form their voice, towards building views about shared inclusive 
goals and values, and establishing how the subgroup’s role and standing fit in with these. 
Consulted and respected in their relevant subgroup identities, people are more likely to 
regard the system as fair and to feel ownership of and commitment to the inclusive goals 
and values (see Haslam, Eggins & Reynolds, 2003). 
 
The concept of identity thus informs regulatory theory and, specifically, the notion of 
responsive regulation (Braithwaite, 2002) in several ways. Namely, it speaks to each of the 
three elements of responsive regulation identified at the beginning of this article. First, as 
shown in the present studies, the concept of identity acknowledges the diversity of 
regulatees and the social foundation of their motives and values. An understanding of 
people’s identity and their positioning in relation to the regulator and other regulatees 
facilitates a diagnosis of their motivational postures (Braithwaite, 1995, 2003b) to which 
regulators can respond with appropriate measures selected from a suite of regulatory 
strategies (Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992). Second, such an analysis points to the potential of, 
and barriers for, voluntary compliance and self-regulation. Personal ethics and moral 
emotions of shame and guilt are mechanisms of self-regulation at the level of individual 
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regulatees. As the present results suggest, these depend in particular on a sense of inclusive 
identity. Therefore, identity formation could be a crucial process for meta-regulation, the 
‘regulation of self-regulation’ (Parker, 2002; see also Braithwaite, 2003) of individuals.  
 
Whether and how these processes apply to corporate entities or their representatives 
remains to be explored. However, it could well be that a company’s commitment to 
national identity and welfare (or its attempt to maintain a public image of this kind) also 
provides a basis for effective corporate self-regulation.  
 
Third, regulatees’ identification in terms of any subgroup, if it occurs, is subjectively real 
and needs to be acknowledged and respected. Regulators cannot simply impose a sense of 
inclusive identity, inclusive norms and values, but rather need to be responsive to the 
identities that regulatees perceive as relevant for themselves in the given context. 
Regulators need to acknowledge regulatees’ subgroup identities and, in fact, work with 
these identities towards a consensus about higher-order values and goals, and means to 
achieve them. 
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